mirror of
https://source.quilibrium.com/quilibrium/ceremonyclient.git
synced 2024-12-26 16:45:18 +00:00
268 lines
7.6 KiB
Go
268 lines
7.6 KiB
Go
//
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// Copyright Coinbase, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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//
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package camshoup
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import (
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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"git.sr.ht/~sircmpwn/go-bare"
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"source.quilibrium.com/quilibrium/monorepo/nekryptology/internal"
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mod "source.quilibrium.com/quilibrium/monorepo/nekryptology/pkg/core"
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)
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// ProofVerEnc is a proof of verifiable encryption for a discrete log
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type ProofVerEnc struct {
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challenge, r *big.Int
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m []*big.Int
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}
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type proofMarshal struct {
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M [][]byte `bare:"m"`
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R []byte `bare:"r"`
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Challenge []byte `bare:"challenge"`
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}
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func (pf ProofVerEnc) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) {
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tv := new(proofMarshal)
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tv.R = pf.r.Bytes()
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tv.Challenge = pf.challenge.Bytes()
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tv.M = make([][]byte, len(pf.m))
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for i, m := range pf.m {
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tv.M[i] = m.Bytes()
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}
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return bare.Marshal(tv)
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}
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func (pf *ProofVerEnc) UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error {
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tv := new(proofMarshal)
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err := bare.Unmarshal(data, tv)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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pf.r = new(big.Int).SetBytes(tv.R)
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pf.challenge = new(big.Int).SetBytes(tv.Challenge)
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pf.m = make([]*big.Int, len(tv.M))
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for i, m := range tv.M {
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pf.m[i] = new(big.Int).SetBytes(m)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// EncryptAndProve is a NIZK where the ciphertext and commitments are computed (t values).
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// The blindings are generated as part of calling this function
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// Return ciphertext and proof created during encryption.
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// "The protocol" from section 5.2 in <https://shoup.net/papers/verenc.pdf>
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// Not using t = g^m*h^s as the idemix protocol does not use it.
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// Guess is that since the knowledge of m is proved in the credential attribute proving protocol.
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// Use this function if the proof is by itself and not part of a bigger composite proof.
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func (ek EncryptionKey) EncryptAndProve(nonce []byte, msgs []*big.Int) (*CipherText, *ProofVerEnc, error) {
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var err error
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blindings := make([]*big.Int, len(msgs))
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for i := 0; i < len(blindings); i++ {
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blindings[i], err = ek.group.RandForEncrypt()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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return ek.EncryptAndProveBlindings(nonce, msgs, blindings)
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}
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// EncryptAndProveBlindings is a NIZK where the ciphertext and commitments are computed (t values).
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// The blindings are generated prior to calling this function
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// Return ciphertext and proof created during encryption.
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// "The protocol" from section 5.2 in <https://shoup.net/papers/verenc.pdf>
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// Not using t = g^m*h^s as the idemix protocol does not use it.
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// Guess is that since the knowledge of m is proved in the credential attribute proving protocol.
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// Use this function if the proof will be part of more proofs.
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func (ek EncryptionKey) EncryptAndProveBlindings(nonce []byte, msgs []*big.Int, blindings []*big.Int) (*CipherText, *ProofVerEnc, error) {
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if len(msgs) != len(blindings) {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("number of messages %d != number of blindings %d", len(msgs), len(blindings))
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}
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if len(msgs) > len(ek.y1) {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("number of messages %d is more than supported by this key %d", len(msgs), len(ek.y1))
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}
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for i, b := range blindings {
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if b == nil {
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return nil, nil, internal.ErrNilArguments
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}
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if msgs[i] == nil {
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return nil, nil, internal.ErrNilArguments
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}
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if b.Cmp(mod.Zero) == 0 {
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return nil, nil, internal.ErrZeroValue
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}
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}
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r, err := ek.group.RandForEncrypt()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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rBlinding, err := ek.group.RandForEncrypt()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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ciphertext, err := ek.encryptWithR(nonce, msgs, r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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hs, err := ek.group.Hash(ciphertext.u, ciphertext.e, nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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ciphertextTValues, err := ek.ciphertextTestValues(rBlinding, hs, blindings)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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challenge, err := ek.fiatShamir(nonce, ciphertext, ciphertextTValues)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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// generate the schnorr proofs
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rHat := ek.schnorr(rBlinding, challenge, r)
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mHat := make([]*big.Int, len(msgs))
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for i, m := range msgs {
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mHat[i] = ek.schnorr(blindings[i], challenge, m)
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}
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return ciphertext, &ProofVerEnc{
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challenge: challenge,
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r: rHat,
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m: mHat,
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}, nil
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}
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// ciphertextTestValues computes commitments for the ciphertext when proving encryption is correct
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func (ek EncryptionKey) ciphertextTestValues(r, hash *big.Int, msgs []*big.Int) (*CipherText, error) {
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twoR := new(big.Int).Lsh(r, 1)
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twoMsgs := make([]*big.Int, len(msgs))
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for i, m := range msgs {
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twoMsgs[i] = new(big.Int).Lsh(m, 1)
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}
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u := ek.computeU(twoR)
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e := ek.computeE(twoMsgs, twoR)
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v := ek.computeV(twoR, hash, false)
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return &CipherText{u, v, e}, nil
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}
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// fiatShamir computes h(n, g, Y2, Y3, Y1, C.U, C.V, C.E, CT.U, CT.V, CT.E)
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func (ek EncryptionKey) fiatShamir(nonce []byte, ciphertext *CipherText, ciphertextTValues *CipherText) (*big.Int, error) {
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hValues := make([][]byte, len(ciphertext.e)+len(ciphertextTValues.e)+len(ek.y1)+9)
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hValues[0] = ek.group.n.Bytes()
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hValues[1] = ek.group.g.Bytes()
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hValues[2] = ek.y2.Bytes()
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hValues[3] = ek.y3.Bytes()
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offset := 4
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for _, y := range ek.y1 {
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hValues[offset] = y.Bytes()
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offset++
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}
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hValues[offset] = ciphertext.u.Bytes()
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offset++
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for _, n := range ciphertext.e {
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hValues[offset] = n.Bytes()
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offset++
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}
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hValues[offset] = ciphertext.v.Bytes()
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offset++
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hValues[offset] = ciphertextTValues.u.Bytes()
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offset++
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for _, n := range ciphertextTValues.e {
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hValues[offset] = n.Bytes()
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offset++
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}
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hValues[offset] = ciphertextTValues.v.Bytes()
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hValues[len(hValues)-1] = nonce
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h, err := internal.Hash([]byte("Coinbase Hash 1.0"), hValues...)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return new(big.Int).SetBytes(h), nil
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}
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// schnorr computes tilde - challenge * value mod n^2
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func (ek EncryptionKey) schnorr(tilde, challenge, value *big.Int) *big.Int {
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r := ek.group.Mul(challenge, value)
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t := new(big.Int).Sub(tilde, r)
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return t
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}
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// VerifyEncryptProof a Proof of Verifiable Encryption
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// See section 6.2.19 in <https://dominoweb.draco.res.ibm.com/reports/rz3730_revised.pdf>
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func (ek EncryptionKey) VerifyEncryptProof(nonce []byte, ciphertext *CipherText, proof *ProofVerEnc) error {
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if ciphertext == nil || proof == nil {
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return internal.ErrNilArguments
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}
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if proof.r == nil || proof.challenge == nil || proof.m == nil {
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return internal.ErrNilArguments
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}
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if ciphertext.u == nil || ciphertext.v == nil || ciphertext.e == nil {
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return internal.ErrNilArguments
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}
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if len(proof.m) > len(ek.y1) {
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return fmt.Errorf("number of messages %d is more than supported by this key %d", len(proof.m), len(ek.y1))
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}
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// Reconstruct u
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// 2c
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c2 := new(big.Int).Lsh(proof.challenge, 1)
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// 2r
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r2 := new(big.Int).Lsh(proof.r, 1)
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// u^{2c} mod n^2
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uc := ek.group.Exp(ciphertext.u, c2)
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// Reconstruct e
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// g^{2r} mod n^2
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gr := ek.group.Gexp(r2)
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// u^{2c} * g^{2r} mod n^2
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u := ek.group.Mul(uc, gr)
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e := make([]*big.Int, len(proof.m))
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for i, mm := range proof.m {
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// e^{2c}
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ec := ek.group.Exp(ciphertext.e[i], c2)
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// y1^{2r}
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yr := ek.group.Exp(ek.y1[i], r2)
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// h^{2m}
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hm := ek.group.Hexp(new(big.Int).Lsh(mm, 1))
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// e = ec * yr * hm mod n^2
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e[i] = ek.group.Mul(ek.group.Mul(ec, yr), hm)
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}
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// Reconstruct v
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// v^{2c}
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hs, err := ek.group.Hash(ciphertext.u, ciphertext.e, nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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vc := ek.group.Exp(ciphertext.v, c2)
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y3hs := ek.group.Exp(ek.y3, hs)
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y2y3hs := ek.group.Mul(ek.y2, y3hs)
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y2y3hsr := ek.group.Exp(y2y3hs, r2)
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v := ek.group.Mul(vc, y2y3hsr)
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ciphertextTestValues := &CipherText{u, v, e}
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challenge, err := ek.fiatShamir(nonce, ciphertext, ciphertextTestValues)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if challenge.Cmp(proof.challenge) == 0 {
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return nil
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} else {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid ciphertext")
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}
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}
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