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39 lines
2.2 KiB
Protocol Buffer
39 lines
2.2 KiB
Protocol Buffer
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syntax = "proto3";
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package quilibrium.node.ceremony.pb;
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option go_package = "source.quilibrium.com/quilibrium/monorepo/node/protobufs";
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import "keys.proto";
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// Describes the transcript of KZG ceremony execution
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message CeremonyTranscript {
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// The active collection of powers over G1
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repeated quilibrium.node.keys.pb.BLS48581G1PublicKey g1_powers = 1;
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// The active collection of powers over G2
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repeated quilibrium.node.keys.pb.BLS48581G2PublicKey g2_powers = 2;
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// The running s^256 G1 witnesses – the choice of the 256th power is to ensure
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// combinatorial birthday paradox-based attacks are not possible. In common
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// KZG ceremonies, the collection of witnesses to PoT pubkeys produce the
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// relationship of e(w*G1, s*G2) == (s'*G1, G2), where w*s == s'. The problem
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// with this is that there are n powers under G2 (excl. the case where PoT
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// ceremonies _only_ have the first G2 power), and so the chance of collision
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// by combination to a target value for s' is feasible such that a sum of a
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// permutation of valid G2 powers could forge witness values to reach a
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// a desired outcome, as there are matching pairs of the G1 and G2 powers to
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// permute. When the number of G2 powers is low, or one, this reduces to the
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// discrete log assumption and so the only viable attack is of
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// O(sqrt(<bit size>)) per Pollard's Rho (barring any advancements), but in
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// many cases the number of G2 powers is high enough such that n! naive
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// combinations of additions are greater (and cheap, since the additions are
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// first tested in G1) than the required time of testing the discrete log,
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// and combined with many generated target values, significantly reduces the
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// amount of time required to complete the attack. This means that in
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// traditional KZG ceremonies, the last contributor to a ceremony can
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// potentially control the secret. Or, we can just track the witnesses to the
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// highest power in the ceremony and avoid the whole problem. :)
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repeated quilibrium.node.keys.pb.BLS48581G1PublicKey running_g1_256_witnesses = 3;
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// The running s^256 G2 powers – see notes on running_g1_256_witnesses for why
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// we do this.
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repeated quilibrium.node.keys.pb.BLS48581G2PublicKey running_g2_256_powers = 4;
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}
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